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This paper lays out a comparative framework for assessing 
the potential, limitations and challenges of a variety 
of emerging institutional innovations in globalized 
regulation. The framework highlights two dimensions 
of effectiveness—the comprehensiveness of coverage, and 
the credibility of the regulatory regime. Performance in 
relation to these two dimensions is assessed for three 
distinctive approaches to globalized regulation: 
i) Government-centric approaches, including treaties, extra-
territorial regulation and government networks—seven 
examples are assessed in the paper. ii) Civil regulation, 
including both joint initiatives by private firms and civil 
society, and wholly private self-regulatory approaches 
—with eight examples assessed. iii) Hybrid approaches, 
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involving multiple governmental and non-governmental 
stakeholders—with three examples assessed. Overall, the 
assessment points to an abundance of innovation—but a 
seeming failure of the many innovations to deliver more 
than, at best, partial successes in meeting the credibility 
and comprehensiveness criteria for effectiveness. The 
paper concludes by suggesting ways in which the distinct 
elements of different approaches might be combined 
so that the whole can be more, rather than less, than 
the sum of its parts. The way forward is likely to be 
incremental and cumulative, bottom-up as well as 
top down – transcending a too neat, and ultimately 
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Purpose and Approach 
 
In recent decades, there has been a growing trend towards globalized approaches to economic 
regulation – i.e. approaches that provide a global framework of rules and/or standards as a 
platform for country-specific action. The trend has been very far-reaching. Examples run the 
gamut of sectors from financial regulation, to regulation of carbon emissions, other 
environmental regulation, regulation of competition, labor standards, global anti-corruption 
initiatives – and many others.  
 
The rapid expansion of these approaches has been accompanied by correspondingly rapid 
institutional innovation. The process has been driven from the bottom-up: practitioners have 
experimented with a diverse array of  initiatives, with different combinations of participants, and 
diverse approaches to rulemaking, monitoring and enforcement – but generally with little 
awareness of the variety of potential approaches, of ways in which their specific initiative fits 
into a broader whole.  This paper aims to fill this gap by assessing comparatively the 
effectiveness of a variety of emerging institutional innovations in globalized regulation. Its 
objectives are: 
  To provide a broad comparative framework within which different approaches to 
globalized regulation can be situated, and their potential, limitations and challenges 
assessed.   
  To examine the interactions among different types of globalized regulation – with the 
intent of identifying a variety of institutional options for globalized regulatory reform that 
may not otherwise be evident. 
 
The paper focuses on two dimensions through which rulemaking, monitoring and enforcement 
influence the effectiveness of globalized regulation:  the comprehensiveness of coverage, and the 
credibility of compliance with the regulatory regime: 
  Rule comprehensiveness influences effectiveness via the extent to which the globalized 
rules cover those countries and companies that significantly affect the outcome that is 
being regulated. 
  Rule credibility influences effectiveness via the extent to which the institutional 
arrangements for rulemaking, monitoring and enforcement provide incentives for 
compliance (and/or disincentives for noncompliance) among those that fall within the 
regulatory net. 
 
Comprehensiveness and, especially, credibility depend upon the quality of regulatory governance 
structures. These structures are built around three sets of functions – rule-making, monitoring, 
and enforcement. Figure 1 overleaf illustrates the channels that link each of these functions to 
regulatory effectiveness. 
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 Of special interest for the present exercise is that each of the rulemaking, monitoring and 
enforcement functions can be undertaken via a variety of mechanisms -- wholly public, wholly 
private or along a spectrum that combines these, at both global and national level.   The paper 
assesses performance in relation to both comprehensiveness and credibility for three distinctive 
approaches to globalized regulation:  
 
  Government-centric approaches, including treaties, extra-territorial regulation and 
government networks. 
  
  Civil regulation, including both joint initiatives by private firms and civil society, and 
wholly private self-regulatory approaches. 
 
  Hybrid approaches --  involving multiple governmental and non-governmental 
stakeholders, as well as approaches where important responsibility for some 
combination of design, monitoring and enforcement lies principally in the hands of a 
transnational body.  
 
The body of the paper provides detailed comparative assessments of effectiveness for each of 
eighteen specific globalized regulatory initiatives – distributed across the three approaches, and 
across five distinct content areas (environment; anti-corruption; finance; labor; and oil/mining). 
This executive summary highlights the key patterns that were evident from the assessment – plus 
some implications as to ways forward to enhance the effectiveness of globalized regulatory 
efforts.  
 
Government-centric Approaches: Patterns, Challenges and Opportunities 
 
Seven examples of government-centric approaches to globalized regulation are discussed in the 
paper: (i) the Montreal Protocol (environment/CFC emissions reduction); (ii) & (iii) the Basel 
Accords and the Financial Stability Board (global banking regulation); (iv)-(vi) the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption; the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention; and the United 
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Office.  Though very different from one another, they all share the following process 
characteristics:   
  The rules are negotiated by government officials, and then promulgated as laws (or 
administrative „codes‟) by national governments. 
  Enforcement is the responsibility of national governments. 
  Monitoring is the responsibility of official, public bodies – national and globalized, with 
the balance varying across the initiatives. 
 
Four propositions as to the extent to which government-centric approaches to globalized 
regulation address the challenges of comprehensiveness and credibility emerge from the 
comparative assessment of the seven examples. 
 
First,  government-centric approaches offer a potentially straightforward route to achieving 
comprehensiveness: The Montreal Protocol, UNCAC and the ILO Core Principles, all have been 
signed by the overwhelming majority of countries. 
 
Second, credibility requires more than signing on to a set of rules -- and the credibility of 
government-centric approaches has been mixed.  Rules need to have sufficient specificity to 
make them capable of being monitored and enforced; there needs to be both good-quality 
monitoring and a sanction for non-compliance. For government-centric regulation, much of this 
is expected to happen at the national level – via the translation of global agreements into national 
statutes or administrative regulations,  that are then enforced domestically. In practice:  
  The Montreal Protocol has achieved strong credibility, with rulemaking, monitoring and 
enforcement all robust.  
  The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the ILO Core Principles generally have been 
incorporated effectively into national laws, and have been monitored systematically at a 
global level, but national-level enforcement has been uneven. And 
  The UN Convention Against Corruption has been incorporated into national law but, 
until recently, has not had any systematic credibility-enhancing arrangements in place for 
monitoring.  
 
Third, even though enforcement  is at the national level, globalized monitoring can readily be 
incorporated into government-centric approaches, and has the potential to buttress credibility. As 
the difficult interactions between the OECD‟s anti-corruption compliance monitoring program 
and the British authorities showed,  robust monitoring does not translate directly into 
enforcement. But that same example also demonstrates that peer pressure, anchored in prior 
endorsement of globalized rules and robust, transparent globalized monitoring can  have an 
impact, even on the actions of sovereign, national governments. 
 
Fourth,  in a world where robust treaty-making and implementation is more the exception 
than the rule, semi-formalized government-networks comprise a promising alternative way of 
engaging governments on global challenges, but with some significant risks. As the examples of 
the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board illustrate, the benefits of government-
network approaches are: v 
 
  They offer a low-cost, pragmatic entry point – organized around technical interactions, 
including the development of good practice principles,  that support the harmonization of 
national regulations.  
  They are scaleable -- an initial group of like-minded countries can come together,  agree 
on a joint approach for addressing some specific issue,  and then invite other countries to 
join in.  
  They leverage  the professionalism and desire for mutual respect  among technical peers 
as an informal „reputation-based‟ means of enforcement. 
The risk is that of  the false comfort of having acted but without addressing adequately either 
comprehensiveness or credibility --  of becoming a comfortable insiders club that fails to reach 
out to other countries, even though their participation is key to achieving the global goal; and of 
being unwilling to rock the boat by monitoring closely whether the affirmations  of participants 
indeed are translating into law and practice on the ground.  
 
Civil Regulation – Patterns, Challenges and Opportunities 
 
Civil regulation is defined as comprising non-statutory processes through which diverse 
combinations of  private firms  and civil society organizations jointly set and monitor rules 
governing the actions of participating transnational firms.  Globalized civil regulation differs 
starkly from „government-centric‟ approaches across the three dimensions highlighted earlier: 
  Rules are negotiated and agreed upon entirely by non-state actors.  
  Monitoring, insofar as it is incorporated into the regulatory arrangements, is the 
responsibility of non-state actors.   
  Enforcement is reputation-, not statute- based.  
 
Eight examples of civil regulation are discussed in the paper: (i) the Forest Stewardship Council; 
(ii)-(iv) civil anti-corruption initiatives (the Transparency International Business Principles; the 
World Economic Forum Partnership Against Corruption Initiative; the International Chamber of 
Commerce Rules of Conduct); (v)-(viii) labor standards initiatives (the Fair Labor Association; 
Social Accountability International; Nike‟s Code of Conduct; and the Worldwide Responsible 
Accredited Production).  Three propositions as to the extent to which globalized civil regulation 
addresses the challenges of comprehensiveness and credibility emerge from the comparative 
assessment of these examples.  
 
First, civil regulations -- being wholly voluntary „clubs‟ of firms, nongovernmental 
organizations and associated stakeholders (e.g. consumers and shareholders) committed to going 
beyond a minimalist approach to global environmental, ethical and social practices --  cannot in 
their nature address effectively the  comprehensiveness dimension of globalized regulatory 
performance. 
 
Second,  civil regulation can be highly credible – exemplified most vividly in the robust, multi-
stakeholder arrangements for rulemaking and monitoring adopted  by the Forest Stewardship 
Council, Social Accountability International, and other  robust standards organizations that have 
affiliated with one another by creating the ISEAL Alliance. 
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Third, peer reputation comprises the critical enforcement mechanism through which civil 
regulation assures credibility – but the incentives of key actors vis-à-vis reputational enforcement 
are mixed.  Reputational enforcement operates via signals from markets (consumers, 
shareholders etc), or from individual and organizational standing with peers; the incentives can 
be positive or negative.  All actors have a clear incentive to signal their good intent. Ambiguity 
as to follow-through may offer the benefits of seeming responsive, but at limited cost.   To 
achieve credibility, reputation-based enforcement thus needs to overcome a wall of skepticism. 
Investment in the credibility of the regulatory arrangements (how the rules are made; how they 
are monitored) becomes key.  
 
 
Hybrid Approaches to Globalized Regulation – Patterns, Challenges and Opportunities  
 
Hybrid approaches -- --  involving multiple governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, as 
well as approaches where important responsibility for some combination of design, monitoring 
and enforcement lies principally in the hands of a transnational body -- comprise yet another 
recent institutional innovation  in  globalized regulation. The key defining feature of these hybrid 
approaches is a process of rulemaking that involves  both governmental and non-governmental 
stakeholders. Monitoring generally has a strong global dimension; enforcement depends in part 
on reputation.  
 
Three examples of hybrid approaches are considered in the paper: (i) the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI); (ii) the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) to end 
the flow of „conflict diamonds‟ into the world maket; and (iii) the International Labor 
Office/International Finance Corporation‟s Better Work program. Three conclusions as to the 
extent to which hybrid approaches address the challenges of comprehensiveness and credibility 
emerge from the analysis.  
 
First, hybrid approaches have the potential to be comprehensive. The KPCS was able to 
incorporate all the major players in the world diamond market. The EITI, though not as 
comprehensive, has been embraced by a large number of governmental and non-governmental 
actors, and official international organizations --  and continues to engage with potential new 
participants. 
 
Second, hybrid approaches have the potential to be credible. Both the KPCS and EITI have put 
in place effective arrangements for monitoring (as has the Better Work program, so far on a 
smaller scale). Both have invested successfully in the legitimacy of their rulemaking and 
monitoring process. This, in turn, provides a strong platform for effective peer-reputation-based 
enforcement.  Especially noteworthy, given the involvement of many official/government 
players, is that the approaches through which both have built credibility are more „civil‟ than 
„government-centric: partnerships with multiple stakeholders; transparent monitoring, contracted 
to non-governmental actors.  
 
Third, though, each of the three hybrid approaches focus single- mindedly on one narrow goal: 
keeping „conflict diamonds‟ out of the international marketplace (KPCS); assuring that accurate 
audited information on payments between governments and international oil and mining vii 
 
companies is transparently made available, including to civil society groups (EITI); and 
providing consolidated, accurate, transparent information on factory-level labor standards 
(„Better Work‟).  It remains uncertain whether the simple, consensual rules that are the 
foundation of the three hybrid  examples  are sufficiently robust and demanding to achieve more 
than modest globalized regulatory objectives.  
 
Enhancing the Effectiveness of Globalized Regulation 
 
Overall, the comparative assessment points to an abundance of innovation – but a seeming 
failure of these many innovations to deliver more than, at best, partial successes in meeting the 
credibility and comprehensiveness criteria for effectiveness: 
  Only three of the eighteen regulatory initiatives that were analyzed -- the Montreal 
Protocol, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and  the Kimberley Process  -- 
meet both criteria. Each of the three was benchmarked as„highly effective‟ for at least 
some of the comprehensiveness, rulemaking, monitoring and enforcement  criteria – and 
as „moderately effective‟  for all of the remainder. 
  Two more (the Forest Stewardship Council and Social Accountability International) are 
strong on the credibility, but weak on the comprehensiveness dimension. 
  A further two (the UN Convention Against Corruption and the ILO Core Principles) have 
comprehensive coverage but limited credibility. 
All of the others achieve middling or worse performance across the two dimensions.  
 
These systematic differences in performance suggest that there might be potential synergies 
between the different types of regulatory forms. A well-designed and implemented treaty, for 
example, remains potentially the most effective of the regulatory forms considered – capable in 
principle of addressing both comprehensiveness and credibility.  Long experience has, however, 
confirmed that treaties – especially genuinely binding  ones – are enormously difficult to 
negotiate and implement.  Other regulatory forms can add value as alternatives  where treaties 
are infeasible – and, perhaps, as entry points for cumulative processes of change that may, on 
occasion, culminate in an international treaty. Figure 2 suggests how a more systematic effort to 
capture these synergies might work.  
 


































The figure highlights interactions among four variables. The first two are  credibility and 
comprehensiveness, discussed earlier. The third comprises multistakeholder engagement which, 
as detailed in the paper, is central to many civil and hybrid globalized approaches. The fourth 
comprises changes in social norms of consumers, citizens and investors (specifically, in the 
context of this paper, in relation to the social, environmental and ethical dimensions of 
production, consumption and trade).   
Two potential feedback loops among these four variables are especially relevant: 
  Feedback loop #1: A credibility-enhancing feedback loop: a mutually-reinforcing 
interaction between multistakeholder engagement and credibility, with enhanced multi-
stakeholder engagement  creating pressure for improved credibility and  gains in 
credibility spurring enhanced engagement. Together, the two  spur changes in social 
norms which, in turn, further fuel the  positive feedback loop. And 
  Feedback loop #2: A comprehensiveness-expanding loop  – as changing social norms, 
strengthened credibility, and enhanced engagement build pressures for additional actors 
to participate in the globalized regulatory platform, thereby helping to expand 
comprehensiveness and, in turn, pressuring others not yet involved to participate in the 
globalized processes.  
The main text of the paper suggests ways in which protagonists of globalized regulation might 
pro-actively leverage these feedback loops – with special potential for enhancing the 
effectiveness of globalized efforts to address corruption, labor standards and (though this has not 
been a main focus of the paper) carbon emissions reduction.   
 
Realizing this potential for virtuous spirals would require a profound shift in approach. Civil and 
government-centric approaches to global regulation generally have been viewed as entirely 
separate from one another, involving different players, different cultures and  much mutual 
suspicion. The approach here calls on the protagonists of different regulatory forms to come to 
terms with their preferred forms‟ limitations – and the potential contribution of other forms.  To 
put it differently: progress in globalized regulation  is not likely to come through some sudden 
top-down breakthrough. Rather, the way forward is likely to be incremental and cumulative, 
engaging and monitoring  across borders, bottom-up as well as top down – transcending a too 
















I:  INTRODUCTION AND APPROACH  
 
 Purpose. In recent decades, there has been a growing trend towards globalized 
approaches to economic regulation – i.e. approaches that provide a global framework of rules 
and/or standards as a platform for country-specific action. The trend has been very far-reaching. 
Examples run the gamut of sectors from financial regulation, to regulation of carbon emissions, 
other environmental regulation, regulation of competition, labor standards, global anti-corruption 
initiatives – and many others.  
 
The underlying reason for the rise of globalized regulation is the surge in global trade, 
investment and financial flows – and the new incentives, opportunities and challenges that have 
resulted for corporations, consumer-citizens, and governments in both developed and developing 
countries:  
  The acceleration of globalization – and of the global level of economic activity more 
broadly – has raised the profile and risks associated with a variety of global public goods 
(or, rather, bads): e.g. infectious diseases, global warming, financial market contagion.  
  Globalized trade and investment has disrupted the regulatory expectations of citizens and 
consumers in northern countries – domestic regulations had been painstakingly developed 
for domestic markets over many decades --  that the goods and services being consumed 
locally, and the companies that produced these goods, met civic environmental social and 
ethical expectations vis-à-vis these product, production process, and corporate conduct 
characteristics.  
  Globalized trade and investment has generated new imperatives among firms for 
improving productivity via enhanced supply chain management, with accompanying 
pressures for harmonization of production systems, standards and norms – both within  
firms, and across firms that are part of inter-connected supply chains. 
 
  The rapid expansion of globalized approaches to regulation in response to these drivers 
has been accompanied by correspondingly rapid innovation in their institutional forms. The 
process has been driven from the bottom-up: practitioners have experimented with a diverse 
array of initiatives, with different combinations of participants, and diverse approaches to 
rulemaking, monitoring and enforcement. Practitioners generally work within a specific 
regulatory arena, often with little awareness of the variety of potential approaches, of ways in 
which their specific initiative fits into a broader whole – or even that what they are doing might 
usefully be understood as contributing to an emerging quilt of globalized regulation.  
 
  This paper aims to fill this gap by assessing comparatively the effectiveness of a variety 
of emerging institutional innovations in globalized regulation. Its objectives are: 2 
 
  To provide a broad comparative framework within which different approaches to globalized 
regulation can be situated, and their potential, limitations and challenges assessed.   
  To examine the interactions among different types of globalized regulation – with the intent 
of identifying a variety of institutional options for globalized regulatory reform that may not 
otherwise be evident. 
 
Approach.  The principal focus of this paper is on the institutional arrangements for 
globalized regulation – and their effectiveness in achieving their intended purposes, whatever 
these may be. This is not the only approach. An alternative would be to focus on the normative 
challenge – the putative gap between market and socially-preferred outcomes (the classic welfare 
economics rationale for economic regulation). Box 1 overleaf summarizes this perspective. 
 
For institutional analysis of globalized regulation, a useful point of departure is the work of 
Oliver Williamson.  Following Coase (1960), Williamson and others have underscored that 
regulatory institutions designed to align collective and private interests can be conceived of as 
governance structures. Governance structures generally are built around three sets of functions – 
rule-making, monitoring, and enforcement. Of special interest for the present exercise is that 
each of these functions can be undertaken via a variety of mechanisms -- wholly public, wholly 
private or along a spectrum that combines these, at both global and national level. Table 1 
illustrates by differentiating between two poles along the spectrum -- public and private 
mechanisms.  
 
Table 1: Regulatory Institutions -- Public and Private  Approaches 
  Public/Statutory  Private/Voluntary 




MONITORING  Public sector; 
 
Peer monitoring 
3rd party verification 
ENFORCEMENT  Justice system/trade restraints  Market reputation (vis-à-vis 





Rulemaking, monitoring and enforcement influence the effectiveness of globalized regulation 
via the content of the rules, via the comprehensiveness of coverage, and via the credibility of 
compliance with the regulatory regime. Figure 1 highlights the key channels.  
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Box 1: Why globalized regulation? – a normative perspective 
Welfare economics provides the appropriate point of departure for clarifying the purpose of globalized 
regulation. By definition, the aim is to produce a result that is different from what would otherwise have 
been the laissez faire outcome. Box Table 1 identifies four distinct possible purposes for regulating at a 
globalized level, and summarizes their relative importance for six regulatory content area (the five 
considered in this paper, plus food safety and quality).  
 
Box Table A: The Motivations for globalized regulation 
 
















Environment  ***  ***  **  * 
Finance  ***  *    ** 
Corruption  **  ***  **   
Oil, mining  *  **  ***   
Labor conditions  *    ***  * 
Food safety and quality  *      *** 
*** = most relevant; ** = somewhat relevant; * = marginally relevant; zero stars = not relevant 
 
As the table summarizes, the purposes are:  
  Provision of global public goods/positive externalities – and/or the mitigation of negative 
externalities. This is, of course, the classic market failure which regulation is intended to address.  
Environnmental regulation is the classic example with, as the table shows, externalities at both global 
and national levels. A second example in the table is the global public bad of contagion from financial 
sector collapse. The corrosion as a result of corruption of ethical norms – which are both a good in 
themselves, and reduce transactions costs – is a third example.  
  Provision of national public goods/externalities [note, though, that efforts by high-income countries to 
mitigate national-level negative externalities in their low-income counterparts are a form of „merit 
good‟ provision.]  National level negative environmental externalities, or externalities from financial 
market failure are two clear examples. Corruption comprises a third example – insofar as it has 
corrosive effects on the public sector, on justice, and on other market institutions.  
  The provision of „merit goods‟/reduction of „demerit bads‟ – may, in the context of globalized 
regulation be thought of as „conscience‟ goods. For example, „northern‟ consumers and citizens may 
seek assurance that the business practices of private firms from their countries meet minimum social, 
environmental and ethical standards, that production overseas meets minimum environmental 
standards, that both contracting and rent sharing in the oil and gas sectors are transparent and do not 
undermine public institutions in weak states, and that worker conditions are acceptable. 
  The regulation of quality/product characteristics and cost. Globalized harmonization of regulations 
around common standards reduces transactions costs. Further, consumers in northern countries may 
seek „northern‟ standards of quality and safety in imported products (e.g. food).  Regulation at source 
– minimum food quality/safety standards (“pesticide free”; “organic” etc.) which can be internalized 
within the global supply chains, and „branding‟ of individual companies – is one way of achieving 
this goal. 
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Rule content influences effectiveness via (a) the extent to which the rules are able to align 
(regulated) private incentives and social value added; and (b) the extent to which rule design 
facilitates monitoring and enforcement – or, alternatively, adds to their complexity. These 
channels are illustrated as channels I(i) & I(ii) in Figure 1 below.  The remainder of this paper 
does not consider further this content dimension: assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the content of specific rules is best done using a narrowly-focused, in-depth empirical 
methodology, not the broadly comparative approach adopted here. 
 





















Rule comprehensiveness influences effectiveness via the extent to which the globalized rules 
cover those countries and companies that significantly affect the outcome that is being regulated 
(channel I(iii) in Figure 1). 
 
Rule credibility influences effectiveness via the extent to which the institutional 
arrangements for rulemaking, monitoring and enforcement provide incentives for compliance 
(and/or disincentives for noncompliance) among those that fall within the regulatory net.  For 
globalized regulation, four channels are especially key to credibility:  
  Rule-process legitimacy: The extent to which the process proceeds in such a way as to 
strengthen the perceived legitimacy of the globalized rulemaking effort among the full 
range of relevant stakeholders (channel I(iv) in Figure 1). 
  Monitoring quality. Credible and cost effective (both financial and transactions costs) 
observation of whether those who have agreed to abide by the rules are indeed following 
through on their commitments is a necessary condition for effective contracting (channel 
2(i)). Monitoring can be at country or global levels – though some global information-




&  Enforcement 
 
Legitimacy  Compliance 
Effective-
ness 
I (i)    comprehensiveness 
I (iii)  content of regulations 
I (ii) ease of  
monitoring 
& enforcement 
I (iv) rule-process 
legitimacy 
2(i)    monitoring  quality  
2 (iii) enforcement quality 
2(iii) monitoring & 
enforcement legitimacy 5 
 
  Enforcement quality. Enforcement influences effectiveness directly insofar as credible 
costs of noncompliance create a credible incentive for compliance (channel 2(ii)). 
Transnational enforcement seemingly conflicts with the principle of national sovereignty 
– suggesting that enforcement poses distinctive challenges for globalized regulatory 
initiatives.  
  Monitoring and enforcement legitimacy. Credible monitoring and enforcement enhance 
the perceived legitimacy of regulation – strengthening the incentive for self-enforcement,  
and thereby both reducing transactions costs of compliance, and extending voluntary 
participation and hence regulatory reach (channel 2(iii) in Figure 1). Gains in voluntary 
participation and self-enforcement are likely to have special relevance for globalized 
regulation insofar as more punitive approaches are less feasible at the global level.  
 
Section II will consider how comprehensiveness and credibility influence regulatory 
effectiveness within each of a variety of globalized regulatory initiatives. Section III considers 
more broadly some potential complementarities, conflicts and synergies among the different 
approaches to globalized regulation – and how insight into these can broaden the toolkit of 
options available to practitioners. 
 
II: THE VARIETIES OF GLOBALIZED REGULATION, AND THEIR 
EFFECTIVENESS 
 
   This section explores the relevance of the framework laid out above in explaining the 
effectiveness of 20 specific globalized regulatory initiatives listed in Table 2. The table groups 
the 20 initiatives across two dimensions. The first comprises the five content areas that are 
considered in this paper: environment; anti-corruption; finance; labor; and oil/mining. The 
second dimension comprises the institutional arrangements, with three distinctive approaches 
highlighted:  
 
  Government-centric approaches, including treaties, extra-territorial regulation and 
government networks. 
  
  Civil regulation, including both collaborative initiatives by private firms and civil 
society, and wholly private self-regulatory approaches. 
 
  Hybrid approaches -- involving multiple governmental and non-governmental 
stakeholders, as well as approaches where important responsibility for some 
combination of design, monitoring and enforcement lies principally in the hands of a 
transnational body. 
  
Section IIA examines government-centric approaches to globalized regulation. Section IIB 
explores civil regulation.  Section IIC examines hybrid approaches.  
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Table 2: Varieties of Globalized Regulation 
  Government-centric approaches  Civil Regulation  Hybrid 
Approaches 
   Treaty  Extra-
territorial 
Government 







   
  Forest Stewardship 
Council;  
   
 
Finance 
     
Basel Accords;  
Financial 









































ILO/IFC Better Work  
Oil, mining    





Kimberley Process 7 
 
 
As the analysis in the sub-sections which follow will show, for all the variety of institutional 
innovation, the most traditional of all approaches to globalized regulation-- a well-designed and 
implemented treaty -- remains potentially the most effective of the regulatory forms considered.  
Long experience has, however, confirmed that treaties – especially genuinely binding ones – are 
enormously difficult to negotiate and implement. An exclusively treaty-oriented approach is thus 
inadequate to address the accelerating regulatory challenges that have accompanied 
globalization.  
 
Other regulatory forms thus emerge as value adding alternatives. They can add value in two 
ways – as alternatives where treaties are infeasible, and (as Section III will examine further) as 
entry points for cumulative processes of change that may, on occasion, culminate in an 
international treaty. Making progress in addressing the challenges of globalized regulation will 
require that the protagonists of different regulatory forms come to terms with their preferred 
forms‟ limitations – and thereby leverage more effectively the constrained, but nonetheless very 
real, contributions each can make to an emerging globalized regulatory architecture. 
 
IIA: Government-centric Approaches to Globalized Regulation 
 
As per Table 2, this sub-section describes and assesses the effectiveness of government-
centric approaches to globalized regulation via a focus on: 
  The Montreal Protocol, a best-practice example of a treaty; 
  The United Nations Convention Against Corruption, the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, plus other  globalized anti-
corruption initiatives; and 
  The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, and the Financial Stability Board – as 
key parts of the globalized regime for banking regulation. 
 
 Though these specific regulatory initiatives are very different from one another in content 
area, in performance and in institutional details, they all share the following process 
characteristics:   
  The rules are negotiated by government officials, and then promulgated as laws (or 
administrative „codes‟) by national governments. 
  Enforcement is the responsibility of national governments. 
  Monitoring is the responsibility of official, public bodies – national and globalized, 
with the balance varying across the initiatives. 
Table 3 previews the discussion with an ordinal, qualitative benchmark of the effectiveness of 
each initiative vis-à-vis the five channels.  The criteria used for each of the benchmarks are laid 
out in Annex A, with the rationales for each assessment laid out in the text throughout this paper. 
   8 
 













Treaties           
- Montreal Protocol  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 







































         














Too soon  
to tell 
Too soon  
to tell 
*** = highly effective; ** = moderately effective; * = minimally effective 
1/  As of 2008 
 
Treaties: The Montreal Protocol.  Scientific research conducted in the 1970s hypothesized 
that the release of hydrocarbons would result in a breakdown of the atmosphere‟s ozone layer, 
with major health hazards (including skin cancer) to humans. Scientific observation, in 1985, of 
an ozone hole, confirmed the hypothesis. Two years later, the Montreal Protocol to cut the use of 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) chemicals was ratified by almost every country on earth.
2 Over the 
past twenty years, the abundance of ozone-destroying gases in the lower atmosphere has been 
declining, and the Antarctic ozone hole is predicted to disappear by the mid-21
st century.  
 
The Montreal Protocol illustrates powerfully the institutional arrangements that underpin an 
effective global treaty. For centuries, treaties have formed the cornerstone of international law.  
Under the traditional practice of treaty creation, different states negotiate very precise, 
unambiguous rules by consensus. The international legal principle of state sovereignty precludes 
one state compelling another to join a treaty.  However, by signing a treaty a state indicates its 
intent to implement the treaty‟s rules through appropriate domestic legislation; in some countries 
a treaty automatically becomes domestic law.  International treaties derive their authority directly 
from legislative mandates of sovereign states – and so inherently achieve legitimacy insofar as 
signatory governments reflect the will of their populations. 
 
Key to the success of the Montreal Protocol has been an approach to design and 
implementation that, as Scott Barrett shows in his landmark analysis,
3 addresses very effectively 
                                                 
2 As of late 2006, only five countries did not participate: Andorra, Iraq, San Marino, Timor Leste, and the 
Vatican. 
3 Scott Barrett, Why Co-operate: The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), p.84. It is worth noting that Barrett very carefully lays out why the robust rulemaking, monitoring and 
enforcement arrangements of the Montreal Protocol cannot be directly applied to global efforts to reduce carbon 
emissions; key is that the benefit-cost ratio is far less favorable for carbon than CFCs.  9 
 
all of the institutional challenges highlighted in Figure 1 and Table 3. Four interrelated features 
are especially key: 
  The monitoring and enforcement arrangements for the treaty are directly tied to trade. 
Signatories agreed that, once the treaty came into effect, they would bar the imports of 
both substances controlled by the treaty (i.e. CFCs), and of products (e.g. refrigerators 
and air conditioners) that contained those substances.  
  The treaty skillfully incorporated a highly credible incentive for participation and 
compliance. Signatories agreed that the treaty would only come into effect once it had 
been signed by countries representing two-thirds of global consumption. This created 
clear incentives to sign: there was no cost to being an early signatory (the two-thirds rule 
meant that no early signatory would have its competitiveness hurt by a cost-increasing 
trade restriction); once the two-thirds tipping point had been reached, market access 
would be enhanced, not restricted, by participating. 
  Compliance could readily be monitored, since whether or not a product contained CFCs 
could straightforwardly be detected. 
  The legitimacy of the rule-making process was enhanced by a commitment by 
industrialized countries to cover the entire incremental cost to developing countries of 
implementing the protocol, with almost $3 billion committed to support implementation.  
Taken together, these features result in the Montreal Protocol receiving the highest benchmark 
score in Table 3 among all the comparators. Consistent with this benchmark, Barrett concludes 
that “the gap between what is being done and the maximum possible effort is very, very small”.  
   
Anti-corruption regulation. As a contrast to the Montreal Protocol, the examples of the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), and the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention illustrate some of the challenges and limitations that can arise with the treaty form of 
globalized regulation. There has been rapid evolution over the past two decades in understanding 
both the costs of corruption for economic development, and what needs to be done to combat it. 
The discourse has evolved from a narrowly moral issue (countered commonly by the pseudo-
wisdom of defending corruption as efficiency-enhancing „grease‟); to an understanding of 
corruption as both a symptom and cause of pervasive institutional weakness within developing 
countries; to recognition that it is a global problem that requires a global response  – with bribe 
givers and bribe takers equally culpable.  
 
Both the OECD and the United Nations conventions are striking examples of international 
momentum to globalize the fight against corruption.  
  The 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention criminalizes bribery of foreign public officials 
and laundering the proceeds of bribery – and lays out in detail obligations of signatories 
for implementation. The Convention has the same standing in international law as a 
treaty, implying that all signatories must implement domestic law which reflects the 
intent of the Convention. It has been joined by all 30 OECD member countries, plus 8 
non-members. 
  UNCAC lays out comprehensive programs of action at the national and global levels -- 
and in principle commits its signatories to promulgate and implement them. It was 
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2003; as of 2009, it had been 
ratified by 140 countries. 10 
 
As Table 3 suggests, coverage is thus comprehensive for UNCAC, but less so -- by definition, 
given its more restrictive membership -- for the OECD Convention; for both,  the rule-making 
process is broadly legitimate.  
 
The difficulty, however,  is that corruption thrives in the shadows of economic life – and its 
purveyors have as much incentive to sign on (deceitfully) to promises of virtue  as do genuine 
champions of ethical practice. For any anti-corruption initiative to be credible, it thus needs to 
pay special attention to monitoring and enforcement – even as monitoring of purposefully 
concealed activity is inherently difficult. As Table 3 signals, this been challenging for both 
conventions – though the OECD has made some especially striking efforts on the monitoring 
front: 
  UNCAC initially delegated responsibility for monitoring and enforcement entirely to the 
individual signatories themselves, but has subsequently committed to a more intensive 
effort: Participants at a 2009 Doha conference of parties to UNCAC agreed that all 
countries would monitor and report on a five-yearly basis – a combination of self-
reporting plus peer review, with executive summaries of the country reports made public.  
  The OECD has put in place an elaborate mechanism for compliance monitoring, based on 
peer reviews, and supported by the OECD‟s 18-staffperson anti-corruption division. In a 
first phase, each signatory‟s laws are reviewed for consistency with the Convention‟s 
standards. A second phase involves intensive on-the-ground review of how well anti-
bribery policies are actually being implemented, plus an elaborate multi-year process to 
follow up on how weaknesses identified in the course of the review are being addressed. 
  For both UNCAC and the OECD Convention, enforcement is wholly at the country level 
– with informed peer pressure the sole international recourse. Both the limitations and 
how they might be at least partially addressed are evident in the refusal in 2006 of the 
British authorities to pursue a corruption investigation of British Aerospace (BAe) on 
national security grounds; the subsequent intensive pressure put on the United Kingdom 
authorities by the OECD Working Group on bribery (including the publication in 2008 of 
a highly critical special review of the UK government‟s record in fighting corruption 
abroad); and, most recently, an announcement in October 2009 by the UK‟s Serious 
Fraud Office that it intends to seek permission to prosecute BAe. 
 
Two non-treaty based approaches to addressing the monitoring and enforcement predicament 
of globalized anti-corruption initiatives round out this (partial) view of globalized anti-corruption 
initiatives. The first comprises the extra-territorial enforcement of the United States Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The FCPA was promulgated by Congress in 1977 after a series of 
international corruption scandals involving U.S. companies.  The FCPA criminalizes the bribing 
of foreign officials by a US citizen or the agent of a US firm, even if the act occurs abroad.  US 
corporations are held liable for actions by all their agents, as well as subsidiaries, and must 
institute due diligence to ensure against corruption. In the first two decades following the 
passage of the FCPA, the Department of Justice (DoJ) brought a total of 37 cases. But 
subsequent to the Enron scandal and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, 
implementation accelerated, with 29 cases brought since 2000. The DoJ‟s definition of its 
jurisdiction has been expansive, and includes activities by non-U.S. headquartered companies 
that are listed on U.S stock exchanges, or whose illicit transactions are funneled through U.S. 
banks. Using these criteria, DoJ prosecutions have been mounted against the Swiss power 11 
 
company, AGG, the German engineering company Siemens, and the Norwegian oil company 
Statoil.  Of course, as Table 3 signals, the weakness of extra-territorial approaches to globalized 
regulation is its unilateral character, and associated limitations on both comprehensiveness, and 
rule-process legitimacy beyond the country‟s borders.
4 
 
The second non-treaty-based globalized approach to anti-corruption comprises wholly „civil‟ 
initiatives. Civil initiatives (discussed further in Section IIB) are especially relevant in this area 
because ultimately, as Figure 1 signals, the effectiveness of all law and regulation – especially 
those focused on as inherently hidden an activity as corruption – depends ultimately on the 
legitimacy of the endeavor. Building a global norm that systematically condemns corruption as 
unacceptable has been challenging. [On the contrary, at least until very recently it has been 
officially condoned as „shrewd‟ business practice; in Germany, until 1999, corrupt side-
payments were tax deductible.] Transforming social norms is thus perhaps the crucial long-run 
challenge in the fight against corruption – which is where the „civil regulation‟ efforts discussed 
in Box 2 and considered further later in this paper, can play an especially crucial role.   
 
Box 2: Civil anti-corruption initiatives 
A variety of non-governmental initiatives to combat corruption have emerged – driven by a combination 
of a strong sense of mission, a sense of a disconnect between marketplace realities and official anti-
corruption conventions and treaties, and a desire to signal the commitment of private firms to a corporate 
governance „race to the top‟.  Examples include: 
  The International Chamber of Commerce, founded in 1919 and the world‟s largest organization 
representing business interests, issued a voluntary set of principles in 1977 which companies 
could adopt to prevent corruption. The rules were updated in 2005 to align them more closely 
with the evolving international consensus in the area. 
  The World Economic Forum‟s Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACI) is an ethical 
standard for private companies developed in 2004, and with 140 signatories, all large-scale global 
companies..  All participating companies agree to self-monitor, although PACI recommends third 
party verification that the anti-corruption program has been implemented – a step which about 
40% of signatories have taken.  
  Transparency International, a global civil society organization combating corruption with a 
network of 90 national chapters, issued its Business Principles for Combating Bribery in 2002, 
and updated them in 2009 to harmonize with the ICC and PACI principles. The principles are 
intended as a resource to guide interested companies. TI also has sponsored „integrity pacts‟ – 
which define mutual commitments to transparency between government and private firms for 
specific large-scale procurement contracts, and include an independent monitor. 
Table 4 in Section IIB benchmarks these civil regulatory initiatives against the credibility and 
comprehensiveness criteria laid out in Figure 1. 
 
Globalized regulation of banking through government networks. The globalized regulation 
of banking is an example of an increasingly ubiquitous -- government-centric but not-treaty-
based -- approach to globalized regulation.  The use of government networks as a tool for 
globalized regulation has been analyzed in depth by Anne-Marie Slaughter in her 2005 book, 
                                                 
4 It is worth noting in this context that an important impetus for the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention was 
pressure from the United States – which perceived that, with it being the only country enforcing anti-bribery 
legislation for actions outside its borders, US companies were not operating on a level playing field. 12 
 
The New World Order. She describes the role of these networks, and their place in the 
international order, as follows:
5   
“Global networks build trust and establish relationships among their participants 
that then create incentives to establish a good reputation and avoid a bad 
one….They exchange regular information about their activities and develop 
databases of best practices…They offer technical assistance and professional 
socialization to members from [other countries]….[They] are created and sustained 
by the valuable exchange of ideas, techniques, experiences and problems….They 
promote convergence, compliance with international agreements, and improved 
cooperation among nations on a wide range of regulatory and judicial issues.” 
As a tool for intergovernmental engagement, government networks  thus facilitate (i) peer-to-
peer learning and alignment,  in the form of shared diagnosis of problems and options for 
addressing them; (ii) sometimes the development of general principles which all participants 
agree to follow; and  (iii) peer-reputation-based commitment to acting on that shared learning.  
 
The evolution of globalized regulation of banking illustrates how government-networks 
function.  Banking regulation is a vast and complex topic. The extent to which financial markets 
should be regulated globally – and, within that, the desirability of the Basel approach to defining 
risk and capital adequacy – continue to be enormously controversial subjects that go well beyond 
the scope of this paper.
6 The discussion here focuses narrowly on a small subset of the larger 
topic -- the globalized institutional arrangements, their comprehensiveness, and their credibility. 
 
Notwithstanding the rapid globalization of finance over the past half century – and the 
seemingly strong incentive to provide common regulatory rules, and a common regulatory 
enforcement umbrella across jurisdictions -- no official global institutional arrangements have 
emerged that parallel the World Trade Organization (or  even the earlier, less robust General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Instead,   regulatory harmonization has evolved through the 
seemingly ad hoc proliferation of inter-governmental committees, many housed in the Basel-
based Bank for International Settlements.  Key steps included: 
  The creation in 1974 of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) by the 
Central Bank Governors of ten leading financial centers to close gaps in the supervision 
of international banks, promulgate standards for bank supervision, and formulate capital 
adequacy standards; and the issuance in 1975 of a concordat on the sharing of regulatory 
responsibilities between a bank‟s home and host countries. 
  The issuance by the BCBS in 1988 of the Basel 1 principles on minimum capital 
adequacy standards for banks; in 1997 of core principles for effective supervision of 
banks by regulators; and, in 2004, after difficult negotiations, of Basel II, which laid out a 
new risk-based approach to setting capital reserves for banks; guidance for supervisors on 
assessing reserves and related issues; and disclosure rules for banks.  
                                                 
5 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The New World Order, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). Quotes are from 
pp. 3-4; 51; 261. 
6 For a discussion of the merits and limitations of alternative approaches, see James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio Jr, 
and Ross Levine, Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); 
Daniel K. Tarullo, Banking on Basel (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008); and 
Dani Rodrik, “Economics Focus: A Plan B for global finance”, The Economist, March 14, 2009.  13 
 
  The establishment in 2009, by the G20 heads of state, in the wake of the global financial 
crisis, of the Financial Stability Board (as a successor to the less formal Financial 
Stability Forum) with a broad mandate to “address vulnerabilities and to develop and 
implement strong regulatory, supervisory and other policies in the interests of financial 
stability.” 
  The release by the BCBS in December 2009, within the context of a broad financial 
sector reform framework set by the G20 heads of state (via the FSB), of consultative 
proposals for strengthening capital standards of banks. 
 
Over time, then, the reach of the BCBS – and of government-centric globalized institutions 
focused on banking regulation – has progressively expanded. The BCBS initially was established 
as an exclusive club of ten financial centers. Prior to 2009 – when twelve additional members 
were added following a call from G20 leaders for standard setting bodies to review their 
membership -- membership expanded gradually, with coverage lagging the expansion of 
globalized finance.  So overall, as per Table 3, the comprehensiveness of coverage of the BCBS-
anchored and government-networked approach to globalized banking regulation has been mixed.  
 
Turning to credibility, for the BCBS (and, by extension and as discussed by Slaughter, 
government networks more broadly), it derives principally from actions at the national level. The 
BCBS is explicit that it “does not possess any formal supranational supervisory authority, and 
its conclusions do not, and were never intended to, have legal force. Rather, it formulates broad 
supervisory standards and guidelines and recommends statements of best practice in the 
expectation that individual authorities will take steps to implement them through detailed 
arrangements - statutory or otherwise - which are best suited to their own national systems. In 
this way, the Committee encourages convergence towards common approaches and common 
standards without attempting detailed harmonization of member countries' supervisory 
techniques.”
7 As this quote underscores, BCBS principles thus achieve their legitimacy via their 
incorporation at the national level into statute or administrative regulation). The inter-
governmental process is wholly technocratically driven without the high-level imprimatur of a 
global treaty, an upper bound on rule-process legitimacy.  
 
Monitoring and enforcement of follow-through by national governments on BCBS principles 
was limited for most of the 25 years of the BCBS system, and is designated as such in Table 3. 
While the BCBS system included an “accord implementation” working group for Basel II, there 
was neither any independent review of implementation, nor any expectation of systematic self-
reporting on implementation by BCBS participants – although in practice the wholly voluntary 
Financial Sector Assessment Program, run jointly by the IMF and the World Bank, provided a 
window into country level implementation. In early 2010, the FSB announced plans to initiate 
single country and thematic peer reviews among FSB members – including expert monitoring of 
national implementation by FSB members of G20/FSB recommendations. 
8 
 
Government-centric approaches to globalized regulation – patterns, challenges and 
opportunities. The examples of Montreal, anti-corruption and banking regulation illustrate how 
                                                 
7 Quoted from the official history of the BCBS and its membership at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm. 
8 Financial Stability Board, “FSB Framework for Strengthening Adherence to Financial Standards”, January 9, 
2010.  http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100109a.pdf 14 
 
the two key drivers of the effectiveness of globalized regulation that are the focus of this paper --  
comprehensiveness and credibility -- play out in relation to government-centric approaches. Four 
patterns are noteworthy. 
 
First, government-centric approaches offer a potentially straightforward route to achieving 
comprehensiveness: The Montreal Protocol, UNCAC and, as discussed further below, the ILO 
Core Principles, all have been signed by the overwhelming majority of countries. 
 
Second, credibility requires more than signing on to a set of rules -- and the credibility of 
government-centric approaches has been mixed.  Rules need to have sufficient specificity to 
make them capable of being monitored and enforced; there needs to be both good-quality 
monitoring and a sanction for non-compliance. For government-centric regulation, much of this 
is expected to happen at the national level – via the translation of global agreements into national 
statutes or administrative regulations that are then enforced domestically. In practice:  
  The Montreal Protocol has achieved strong credibility, with rulemaking, monitoring and 
enforcement all robust.  
  The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention generally has been incorporated effectively into 
national laws, and has been monitored systematically at a global level, but national-level 
enforcement has been uneven. [As discussed in Section IIB below, this combination of 
seeming national acceptance of the globalized rules, and quite effective global 
monitoring, but a lack of enforcement at the country level also is evident for another 
government-centric example, the ILO Core Principles].  
  The UN Convention Against Corruption has been incorporated into national law but, 
until recently, has not had any systematic credibility-enhancing arrangements in place for 
monitoring.  
 
Third, even though enforcement is at the national level, globalized monitoring can readily be 
incorporated into government-centric approaches, and has the potential to buttress credibility. As 
the difficult interactions between the OECD‟s anti-corruption compliance monitoring program 
and the British authorities showed, robust monitoring does not translate directly into 
enforcement. But that same example also demonstrates that peer pressure, anchored in prior 
endorsement of globalized rules and robust, transparent globalized monitoring can have an 
impact, even on the actions of sovereign, national governments.
9  
 
Fourth,  in a world where robust treaty-making and implementation is more the exception than 
the rule, the government-network approach analyzed by Slaughter, and illustrated here by the 
Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board,  comprises a promising alternative way of 
engaging governments on global challenges, but with some significant risks. The benefits of 
government-network approaches are: 
  They offer a low-cost, pragmatic entry point – organized around technical interactions, 
including the development of good practice principles, that support the harmonization of 
national regulations.  
                                                 
9  For a general discussion of the role of transparent monitoring as a regulatory tool (focused principally on 
domestic examples in the United States, but including also some international examples), see Archon Fung, Mary 
Graham and David Weil, Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency (New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007).  15 
 
  They are scaleable -- an initial group of like-minded countries can come together, agree 
on a joint approach for addressing some specific issue, and then invite other countries to 
join in.  
  They leverage the professionalism and desire for mutual respect among technical peers as 
an informal „reputation-based‟ means of enforcement. 
The risk is that of the false comfort of having acted but without addressing adequately either 
comprehensiveness or credibility -- of becoming a comfortable insiders club that fails to reach 
out to other countries, even though their participation is key to achieving the global goal; and of 
being unwilling to rock the boat by monitoring closely whether the affirmations  of participants 
indeed are translating into law and practice on the ground.  
   
IIB: Civil Regulation 
 
This section examines the efficacy of globalized civil regulation. Civil regulation is defined as 
comprising non-statutory processes through which diverse combinations of private firms and 
civil society organizations jointly set and monitor rules governing the actions of participating 
transnational firms.  The forces that have given rise to civil regulation are similar to the overall 
drivers of globalized regulation noted at the beginning of this paper, with a few distinctive 
features: (i) an effort by civil society actors to narrow the disconnect between burgeoning civic 
activism on the one hand, and a laissez faire/neo-liberal orientation among many governments on 
the other; (ii) an increasing awareness by global corporations of the reputational risks associated 
with  environmental, social and ethical conduct that was unacceptable to key stakeholders; and 
(iii) the surge in information and communication technologies that communicated corporate 
practices instantaneously across the globe – and that (together with increasingly robust supply 




Civil regulation differs starkly from „government-centric‟ approaches to globalized regulation 
across all three dimensions highlighted earlier: 
  Rules are negotiated and agreed upon entirely by non-state actors.  
  Monitoring, insofar as it is incorporated into the regulatory arrangements, is the 
responsibility of non-state actors.   
  Enforcement is reputation-, not statute- based.  
Tables 4 and 5 list eight examples of globalized civil regulation.  As the tables signal, these 
examples group into two broad categories -- collaborative approaches involving both private 
firms and civil society, and approaches undertaken exclusively among private firms, with no 
civil society engagement.  
 
While the examples of civil regulation considered here are very varied, one overarching 
limitation is worth noting up front: Civil regulations -- being wholly voluntary „clubs‟ of firms, 
nongovernmental organizations and associated stakeholders (e.g. consumers and shareholders) 
committed to going beyond a minimalist approach to global environmental, ethical and social 
practices --  cannot in their nature address effectively the  comprehensiveness dimension of 
globalized regulatory performance that was highlighted earlier.  This does not render them 
                                                 
10 For broad overviews, see Vogel (2005, 2006), Ruggie (2002) and Zadek (2006).  16 
 
irrelevant –some examples benchmark well against the credibility dimension of effectiveness --  
but, as Section III will explore in detail, it does suggest that their contribution to globalized 
regulation is best understood as part of a broader globalized regulatory whole. 
 
The ISEAL approach to collaborative regulation. Both civil society and corporate actors 
have championed civil regulation. But their motivations and incentives have been different. As a 
result, one key question has come to center stage: On what basis can stakeholders assess whether 
the claims made as to the quality of corporate practices are indeed true?   To illustrate how civil 
regulation emerges, and how the question posed above has been addressed, consider the example 
of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).  
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The FSC was created by a coalition of firms and NGOs in the wake of the failure of the 1992 
Earth Summit to address effectively the challenge of sustainable forest management and 
protection.  Using multi-stakeholder governance arrangements, it has delineated principles for 
sustainable forestry to which participating firms must adhere. It also has accredited private 
auditing agencies to monitor and certify firms‟ compliance.  Compliant firms can use the FSC 
seal, differentiating their products among buyers and potentially creating a small price premium.  
Among developing countries, its largest presence is in South Africa, where FSC-certified wood 
comprises over 70% of the sales of that country‟s forestry industry (an industry that 
overwhelmingly is organized around large-scale [temperate] plantations, ideally suited for the 
FSC approach). The FSC‟s largest aggregate coverage is in Brazil – but, given the vastness of the 
country‟s forests, FSC-certified products account for less than 10% of the country‟s annual wood 
sales.  
 
As a way of further buttressing credibility, the FSC has joined with other robust collaborative 
standards initiatives – including Social Accountability International (discussed in the next 
subsection), Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, the Marine Stewardship Council, 
and the Rainforest Alliance –  under the umbrella of the ISEAL Alliance. Full membership of the 17 
 
alliance is given only to organizations that meet all of ISEAL‟s standards requirements, 
including:
11 
  For rule-setting, compliance with ISEAL‟s Code of Good Practice for Setting 
Environmental and Social Standards, which includes requirements for: involving, and 
reflecting a balance of interests among, all parties concerned with or directly affected by 
the standard; a multi-stage review process with opportunities for comment by interested 
parties, and feedback on how the comments are addressed;  prompt publication, and 
periodic review, of the finalized standard. 
  For offering certitication that producers meet a standard: assurance that certifying 
organizations are in compliance with the International Standards Organization, ISO‟s 
standard for certification bodies (ISO 17021, Guide 65) or equivalent. 
  For processes of accrediting certifiers: assurance that the accrediting organizations are in 
compliance with ISO/IEC 17011:2004. 
 
Based on the robustness of these criteria, the FSC and SAI benchmark high in Table 4 for 
both rule-process legitimacy and for the quality of monitoring. Robust rule-setting and 
monitoring  provide, in turn, a strong signal to consumers and other stakeholders that certified 
producers indeed are in compliance with a stringent standard of environmental and social 
practice, enhancing reputational enforcement.  
 
Regulating labor standards. Of all the regulatory areas considered in this paper, labor 
comprises the one with the longest track record of globalized approaches, through the 
International Labor Organization (ILO).  The ILO was established in 1919. Currently, it has 183 
member states. Each has four representatives: two from government, one representing 
employers, and one representing workers. Over the course of its ninety year existence, it has 
adopted almost 200 conventions. In 1998, the ILO adopted a “Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work”, which highlighted four core principles: freedom of association 
and collective bargaining; elimination of forced and compulsory labor; elimination of 
discrimination in the workplace; and elimination of child labor;
12 signing on to the Declaration 
became a requirement for ILO membership. ILO committees (the Governing Body Committee on 
the Freedom of Association, and the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards and 
Recommendations) provide a substantial platform for monitoring the extent of compliance. 
However, as Table 5 suggests,  the ILO generally has not been able to systematically translate 
the formal commitments laid out in its convention into actions on the ground.
13 
 
Over the past decade, notwithstanding the presence of the ILO, the highest profile globalized 
initiatives have been civil rather than official. The process was fuelled by a combination of civil 
society activism, and revelations about labor practices that risked damaging corporate reputations 
                                                 
11 For details, see the detailed presentation and discussion of standards tools at www.isealalliance.org. Associate 
members are organizations that are in the process of complying with the standards. 
12 It is perhaps worth noting that compliance with these core labor standards was endorsed in the World Bank‟s 
1995 World Development Report, Workers in an Integrating World.  
13  See Hagen (2003). 18 
 
and brands. The result was a proliferation of labor standards initiatives that ran the gamut from 
multi-stakeholder to firm-specific initiatives, including examples
14 in Table 5: 
  Social Accountability International (an ISEAL member), established in 1997 by a multi-
stakeholder civil society and private sector coalition to develop what became the SA8000 
standard of good labor practices.  In 2007 SAI spun off an independent company to 
accredit auditing agencies to certify factories‟ compliance with SA8000 standards.  As of 
2008, over 2,000 factories, with 1.1 million employees, were certified as SA8000 
compliant.  
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  The multi-stakeholder Fair Labor Association (FLA), an outgrowth of an Apparel 
Industry Partnership convened by President Clinton in 1996. Thirty major global high-
visibility-brand companies (e.g. Nike, Liz Claiborne, H&M) have committed to abide by 
the FLA Code of Conduct throughout their supply chain; nine have been accredited as 
fully complying with the Code. Taken together the 30 brands source from about 5,000 
factories worldwide, employing over 4 million workers. Independent monitors visit, 
unannounced, a random selection of 120 factories each year. Details of each affiliated 
company‟s labor standards commitments, and the findings of the unannounced visits, are 
posted on the FLA web site. 
  Nike‟s Code of Conduct, a best practice example of in-house, self-managed corporate 
practice (there are many others of similar quality). Nike has 90 full-time compliance 
staff. In addition to participation in the FLA program, Nike has two internal monitoring 
programs that are conducted for all factories from which it sources its production: one-
                                                 
14 In addition to those listed in Table 5, other noteworthy examples include the multi-stakeholder Ethical Trading 
Initiative and the non-private-sector Workers Rights Consortium. 19 
 
day overview audits that give a broad assessment of a factory‟s labor, environmental, 
safety and health standards; and  in-depth management and working conditions audits, 
undertaken over several days. Independent research has shown that there is considerable 
variation among Nike‟s suppliers in the extent of their compliance with its code of 
conduct, even after repeat audits; the best performers, with clear evidence of 
improvement over time, are those that have been designated by Nike as „strategic 
partners‟.
15 
  The Worldwide Responsible Accreditation Production (WRAP) program is a non-profit 
non-governmental organization created by an apparel manufacturing association. 
WRAP‟s principles were developed by manufacturers in consultation with other 
stakeholders. Factories seeking WRAP certification conduct a self-assessment, and pay 
an accredited third party auditor to monitor their behavior. Over 600 facilities have been 
certified as meeting the WRAP principles.  
 
As these examples illustrate, the terrain of civil labor standards is thus complex and varied: 
Some initiatives invest heavily in building consensus among stakeholders on minimum 
standards; others develop their codes more unilaterally. Many initiatives put significant effort 
into monitoring –some give priority to providing detailed, objective assurance of compliance 
over time, others focus on an initial snapshot, supplemented by support for building factory-
based capacity for code implementation.   
 
One consequence of this complexity has been a proliferation of factory-specific auditing 
requirements, imposing high transactions costs on factories.  A hybrid initiative (more on hybrids 
below) -- the „Better Work‟ program, -- aims to address this problem directly.  The Better Work 
program is  a joint initiative of the ILO and the World Bank Group‟s private sector investment 
arm the International Finance Corporation. Its origins lie in a 1999 trade agreement between the 
United States and Cambodian government that gave garment exports from Cambodia preferential 
access to the U.S. market in exchange for a commitment to raise labor standards, and linked that 
commitment to an innovative approach to monitoring. Based on the success of the Cambodia 
program, it is being scaled up in four additional countries (Jordan, Vietnam, Lesotho and Haiti), 
with many more intended to follow.  At the heart of the program is a unified platform of factory-
level assessments, with the data made available to buyers and other stakeholders; based on the 
credibility of the data, buyers then agree to forego their separate assessments. The data also 
provide a platform for assurance of compliance with national labor regulations, without relying 
on public sector inspectorates. The concrete result is a radical streamlining of administrative 
demands on participating factories.  
 
Civil approaches to globalized regulation – patterns, challenges and opportunities. The 
illustrations above highlight how civil regulation plays out in relation to the two key institutional 
drivers of the effectiveness of globalized regulation -- comprehensive and credibility.  Five 
themes are noteworthy. 
 
                                                 
15 Richard Locke, Fei Qin and Alberto Brause, “Does Monitoring Improve Labor Standards? Lessons from 
Nike”, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper number 24, Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University, 2006.  20 
 
First, as noted at the outset of this section, given their voluntary, bottom-up character, civil 
regulatory initiatives cannot in their nature address effectively the comprehensiveness dimension 
of globalized regulatory performance. 
 
Second, civil regulation can be highly credible – exemplified most vividly in the robust, 
multi-stakeholder arrangements for rulemaking and monitoring adopted  by full members of the 
ISEAL Alliance. 
 
Third, peer reputation comprises the critical enforcement mechanism through which civil 
regulation assures credibility – but the incentives of key actors vis-à-vis reputational enforcement 
are mixed.  Reputational enforcement operates via signals from markets (consumers, 
shareholders etc.), or from individual and organizational standing with peers; the incentives can 
be positive or negative.  Many consumers are willing to pay a significant premium for 
„sustainability‟, if it is credible. (See Box 3.)   All actors thus have a clear incentive to signal their 
good intent. However, ambiguity as to follow-through may offer the benefits of seeming 
responsive, but at limited cost.   To achieve credibility, reputation-based enforcement thus needs 
to overcome a wall of skepticism. Investment in the credibility of the regulatory arrangements 
(how the rules are made; how they are monitored) becomes key.  
 
Box 3: The growth of ‘fair trade’ 
The rapid growth of products certified as „fair trade‟ signals that consumers respond to a credible signal 
on social, environmental and ethical standards. The principle of ethical purchasing is a longstanding one, 
dating back at least to various nineteenth century religious organizations and, more recently, co-operative 
producer and consumer movements, with Oxfam‟s 1965 „helping by selling‟ program an important 
precursor.  
 
The collapse of the International Coffee Agreement in 1989 spurred efforts to find an alternative way of 
protect the livelihoods of small-scale coffee producers. This resulted in the emergence of a variety of 
initiatives to provide a credible „fair trade‟ signal in the marketplace – not as a unique product/brand but 
as label that could be adopted, in selected product markets,  by producers and distributors that credibly 
commit to meet „fair trade‟ standards. In 1997, these initiatives came together to form the umbrella Fair 
Trade Labeling Organization (a member of the ISEAL Alliance). Sales growth of „fairtrade‟ labeled 
products has been rapid: 
  In 2000, global sales amounted to about $300 million. In the subsequent seven years, global sales 
rose over ten-fold – an almost 50 percent average annual growth rate --  to reach $4 billion in 
2008, including 22 percent year-on-year growth for 2008, despite the  global economic crisis.  
  The market is overwhelmingly in North America and Western Europe, largest in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. The Japanese market, though still small, grew at 44% in 2008.  
  Coffee is the largest „fairtrade‟ labeled product, with 2008 sales amounting to $1.8 billion, 
Bananas (at over $550 million, mostly in Europe), are the second largest fair-trade seller. Tea, 
cocoa, cotton, sugar and flower each had 2008 fair trade sales in excess of $250 million. The US 
fair-trade labeling organization recently has introduced a fair-trade labor standard for cotton 
garments, covering the conditions of both cotton production, and cut-and-trim sewing operations.  
A recent large-scale survey found that the proportion of U.S. consumers reporting that they rewarded 
companies for being socially responsible has risen from 46% in 1999 to 59% in 2009.  
 
Sources: Global Fairtrade Foundation, “Global Fairtrade sales increase by 22%”, press release, June 8, 2009. 
Wikipedia, Transfair USA, “Fair trade thriving in tough U.S. economy”, press release, April 16, 2009. 
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IIC: Hybrid Approaches to Globalized Regulation 
 
Hybrid approaches -- --  involving multiple governmental and non-governmental 
stakeholders, as well as approaches where important responsibility for some combination of 
design, monitoring and enforcement lies principally in the hands of a transnational body -- 
comprise yet another recent institutional innovation  in  globalized regulation. The key defining 
feature of these hybrid approaches is a process of rulemaking that involves both governmental 
and non-governmental stakeholders. Monitoring generally has a strong global dimension; 
enforcement depends in part on reputation.  
 
The two illustrative hybrid examples considered here are the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). (A third 
example, the ILO/IFC Better Work program was discussed earlier.) Both programs have been 
widely acclaimed as innovative initiatives to combat the corrosive effects on governance in 
institutionally weak and collapsed states of corruption and illegality associated with the 
exploitation of natural resource rents.  Both have addressed rulemaking, monitoring and 
enforcement in innovative ways. 
 
Rulemaking.  The role of non-governmental stakeholders was decisive in the genesis of both 
programs. A key precursor to the EITI was the release in 1999, by the international NGO Global 
Witness, of the study “A Crude Awakening”, which documented the links between oil, banking 
and corruption in Angola. Immediately thereafter Global Witness, together with the Open 
Society Institute, Oxfam, Transparency International, Save the Children and other NGOs 
launched a campaign to pressure global oil and mining companies to “Publish What You Pay”. 
The then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair announced the multi-stakeholder EITI initiative at 
the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development; the EITI was launched the following year.  
 
The antecedents of the Kimberley Process were strikingly similar: a 1999 campaign, also 
initiated by Global Witness, to expose the role of diamond revenues in fuelling conflict; by 
November 2000, the United Nations General Assembly had passed a resolution supporting the 
creation of an international certification scheme for rough diamonds; within two years, 
governments, the private sector and civil society actors had agreed on the KPCS.  
 
As benchmarked in Table 6, the KPCS is more comprehensive in its coverage than is the 
EITI. The KPCS has 75 member country governments – both diamond-exporting and diamond-
importing countries; together these members account for 99 percent of the world diamond trade. 
The EITI distinguishes between „implementing‟ and „supporting‟ countries. As of late 2010, 
thirty three country governments (32 natural resource exporting developing countries plus 
Norway) had signed up as „candidate‟ countries for EITI implementation; five of these (Liberia; 
Azerbaijan; Timor Leste; Mongolia; and Ghana) had been validated (as per criteria discussed  
further below)  as compliant with the EITI criteria. All of the G-7 members are among the EITI‟s 
17 „supporting‟ countries. But some major oil exporting countries (e.g. Angola, Sudan) currently 
are not part of the EITI process; and none of the BRICS countries have signed up as either 
supporters or members.  
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 Both civil society and the private sector play a role in the ongoing governance of the two 
programs – with their role more extensive in EITI.  Membership of EITI‟s twenty person board 
is distributed among each of the four categories of implementing countries, supporting countries, 
civil society organizations, and the private sector.  By contrast, the KPCS is an organization of 
member states. In addition, two civil society organizations -- Global Witness and Partnership 
Africa Canada -- have a semi-official status as „observers‟, as does the  private sector, through 
the World Diamond Council. Even though the KPCS is thus less participatory than the EITI, the 
combination of its antecedents in a civil society campaign and the continuing role in governance 
of these non-governmental organizations suggest that, together with EITI, it appropriately can be 
benchmarked in Table 6 as being at least moderately effective in the legitimacy of its rule-
processes.  
 
Monitoring and enforcement. Monitoring lies at the heart of the missions of both the EITI 
and KPCS.  The KPCS monitors the source of rough diamonds sold on the international 
marketplace. This largely is achieved through in-built incentives to police the system on the part 
of key stakeholders.  Two commitments are key: 
  A requirement that all shipments of diamonds be accompanied by a certificate, issued by 
the seller, guaranteeing that they are conflict-free.  And 
  An agreement by participants in the KPCS (which included all major importers) that they 
would not engage in trade in rough diamonds with non-participant countries.  
The diamond trade has long been tightly-controlled by a narrow group of dominant companies 
and countries; diamonds from new sources – including conflict countries – threatened to 
destabilize this equilibrium. Viewed from that perspective, the KPCS was a „win-win‟: The 
tightly managed supply meant that the World Diamond Council and its principal members could 
straightforwardly implement the certification scheme.  The fact that this kept diamonds from a 
subset of emerging competitors off the market was –again from the perspective of the established 
exporters -- only to the good. Hence the KPCS‟s relatively robust effectiveness benchmarking 
against the Table 6 monitoring and enforcement criteria.  
 
Note, though, that the KPCS‟s incentive for self-enforcement only works insofar as it focuses 
narrowly on diamonds from non-participant conflict countries. Any effort to impose standards 
through the KPCS on the business practices of participant countries is less incentive-compatible, 
and hence more likely to meet with opposition – as has been evident in a continuing 
unwillingness of the KPCS to exclude Zimbabwe, despite allegations of flagrant human rights 
abuses by senior military officers who had been given control over some of the country‟s 
diamond-digging areas.  
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For the EITI, the in-built incentives for self-regulation were fewer. To be sure, international 
oil and mining companies subject to legal prohibitions  against corruption at home or abroad, and 
vulnerable to shareholder activism, had a clear incentive to promote the EITI as a way of 
avoiding a no-win (for them) „race to the bottom‟ with international companies less restrained by 
such strictures. But the incentives for exporting country governments were less clear. In the 
short-run, a combination of principled leadership and encouragement by donors has proven 
sufficient to induce an initial round of exporting countries to sign-up. Signing up, however, does 
not in itself equate to credible commitment. More robust institutional arrangements were needed 
to lock-in incentives for enhanced transparency and oversight over oil revenues.   Three sets of 
rules aim to help the EITI achieve these latter goals:  
  Rules that focus on financial transfers between governments and energy and mining 
companies. The rules require governments to provide information, audited according to 
international standards, as to what payments they have received from these companies, 
with parallel information from the companies themselves, also audited according to 
international standards, as to what payments they have made.
16  Further, the rules require 
that an organization be contracted to reconcile these figures – and that the report 
containing the various sources of data, any discrepancies uncovered, and their 
reconciliation, be made public.  
  Rules that mandate the establishment at country level of a multi-stakeholder group, with 
„adequate representation‟ of major civil society, private sector, government and other 
stakeholders, to oversee the country‟s EITI implementation. Beyond this multi-
stakeholder group, the rules also require that civil society more broadly be actively 
engaged in the process.  
  Rules that require an external validator, selected from a list of validators accredited by 
EITI, to assess whether an EITI „candidate‟ country has met all the EITI criteria and so is 
EITI compliant. The validator‟s report needs to be viewed as broadly acceptable by the 
country level multi-stakeholder group – with the final decision on compliance   made by 
the global EITI Board. All candidate countries are required to conduct a validation 
exercise within two years of having signed-up (and hence having met the sign-up criteria) 
for EITI, else their candidacy will be suspended. 
 
As per Table 6, these rules provide a robust, and legitimate, framework for monitoring and 
enforcement.  It remains to be seen, however, to what extent signatory country government 
indeed will prove willing to abide by these EITI rules for involving non-governmental 
stakeholders in oversight. While ten countries had achieved compliant status by mid-2011, others 
had failed to meet the initial deadlines for achieving full compliance and were granted 
extensions.  
 
Hybrid approaches – patterns, challenges and opportunities.  Three patterns are noteworthy 
as to how hybrid approaches to globalized regulation address the institutional challenges of 
comprehensiveness and credibility. 
 
                                                 
16 Note that all oil and mining companies active in countries that have joined the EITI are obligated to provide 
this information, regardless of whether they themselves are formally affiliated (as supporters) with the EITI. 
Corporate supporters are not, however, required to provide this information for payments made in non-EITI 
countries.  24 
 
First, hybrid approaches have the potential to be comprehensive. The KPCS was able to 
incorporate all the major players in the world diamond market. The EITI, though not as 
comprehensive, has been embraced by a large number of governmental and non-governmental 
actors, and official international organizations -- and continues to engage with potential new 
participants. 
 
Second, hybrid approaches have the potential to be credible. Both the KPCS and EITI have 
put in place effective arrangements for monitoring (as has the Better Work program, so far on a 
smaller scale). Both have invested successfully in the legitimacy of their rulemaking and 
monitoring process. This, in turn, provides a strong platform for effective peer-reputation-based 
enforcement.  Especially noteworthy, given the involvement of many official/government 
players, is that the approaches through which both have built credibility are more „civil‟ than 
„government-centric: partnerships with multiple stakeholders; transparent monitoring, contracted 
to non-governmental actors.  
 
Third, though, it remains uncertain whether the simple, consensual rules that are the 
foundation of the two hybrid examples are sufficiently robust and demanding to achieve more 
than modest globalized regulatory objectives. Both the KPCS and the EITI focus single- 
mindedly on one narrow goal: keeping „conflict diamonds‟ out of the international marketplace 
(KPCS); and assuring that accurate audited information on payments between governments and 
international oil and mining companies is transparently made available, including to civil society 
groups (EITI).  While the KPCS ambitions do not go beyond its immediate purpose, the vision of 
the EITI potentially is broader. The hope is that transparency and civil society engagement can 
be a springboard for broader accountability over how public resources are used, and hence gains 
in both governance and poverty reduction. Whether these dynamics will play out along the lines 
hoped by the EITI in more than a modest number of countries remains uncertain.    
 
 
III: ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GLOBALIZED REGULATION 
 
As Section II has detailed, government-centric, civil and hybrid approaches to globalized 
regulation each have distinctive strengths and weaknesses. Overall, there appears to be an 
abundance of innovation – but a seeming failure of these many innovations to deliver more than, 
at best, partial successes in meeting both the credibility and comprehensiveness criteria for 
effectiveness: 
  Only three of the eighteen regulatory initiatives that were analyzed -- the Montreal 
Protocol, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the Kimberley Process -- 
met both criteria. Each of the three was benchmarked as „highly effective‟ for at least 
some of the comprehensiveness, rulemaking, monitoring and enforcement criteria – and 
as „moderately effective‟ for all of the remainder. 
  Two more (the Forest Stewardship Council and Social Accountability International) are 
strong on the credibility, but weak on the comprehensiveness dimension. 
  A further two (the UN Convention Against Corruption and the ILO Core Principles) have 
comprehensive coverage but more limited credibility. 
All of the others achieve middling or worse performance across the two dimensions.  
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This final section explores what might be the prospects for combining the distinct elements of 
the different approaches so that the whole can be more, rather than less, than the sum of its parts.  
Specifically, might it be possible to strengthen the synergies between, on the one hand, the 
credibility-enhancing characteristics of civil and hybrid regulation and, on the other, the 
opportunity for comprehensiveness offered by more government-centric approaches? Figure 2 
suggests one possible answer.  
 
The figure highlights interactions among four variables:  credibility and comprehensiveness, 
plus multi-stakeholder engagement and changes in social norms.  Two potential feedback loops 
are noteworthy: 
  Feedback loop #1: A credibility-enhancing feedback loop: with enhanced multi-
stakeholder engagement creating pressure for improved credibility; gains in credibility 
spurring enhanced engagement; and both spurring changes in social norms which, in turn, 
further fuel the positive feedback loop. And 
  Feedback loop #2: A comprehensiveness-expanding loop – as changing social norms, 
strengthened credibility, and enhanced engagement build pressures for additional actors 
to participate in the globalized regulatory platform, thereby helping to expand 
comprehensiveness and, in turn, pressuring others not yet involved to participate in the 
globalized processes.  
The evolution of the EITI and the Kimberley Process from civil society to multi-stakeholder 
initiative -- with sign up by a a large and, for EITI, growing number of governments – illustrate 
how these feedback loops can interact with one another. So, too, does the rapid growth of „fair 
trade‟ certified products.  
 















  What are the opportunities for pro-actively leveraging these feedback loops as a way of 
enhancing effectiveness in other areas? A full answer would require more in-depth work than is 
feasible here. For now, what will have to suffice are some initial guideposts to what might be 
ways forward for more in-depth work in each of three areas -- anti-corruption, labor standards, 




















For anti-corruption, the challenge is to complement the comprehensiveness provided by 
UNCAC with enhanced credibility. Anti-corruption efforts by non-governmental stakeholders 
have focused principally on high-profile advocacy, with only limited effort – at least until 
recently
17 – to invest in a mechanism capable of credibly communicating the commitment of 
participating firms to ethical business practices. The Figure 3 framework suggests one possible 
way in which better alignment of government and civil regulatory initiatives could set in motion 
a virtuous spiral of change: 
  A first step could be to scale-up investment in the credibility of civil anti-corruption 
initiatives (designated by the “1” in Figure 3).  
  Stronger credibility on the part of civil regulatory initiatives could, in turn, strengthen the 
social norm against corruption, and generate a further round of multi-stakeholder effort 
(channels 2a and 2b in Figure 3).  
  In addition, a stronger credibility signal could create new opportunities for enhancing the 
effectiveness of the more comprehensive government-centric approaches (channel 3) -- 
by, say, creatively linking credible private commitments to ethical practices to low-
transactions  cost access to large-scale public procurement (along the lines pioneered by 
Transparency International‟s „integrity pact‟ initiatives in countries ranging from 
Colombia to Korea).
18 
  Strengthening these multiple channels could bring added momentum to both feedback 
loops, thereby enhancing the overall effectiveness of globalized anti-corruption efforts. 
(channel 4) 
 
















   For labor standards, the prevailing pattern is paradoxical. On the one hand, both 
comprehensiveness and credibility are strong – however they are disconnected from one another.  
The (government-centric) ILO‟s various codes parallel UNCAC in their (comprehensiveness) 
                                                 
17 Both the World Economic Forum‟s Partnership Against Corruption Initiative and Transparency International 
(vis-à-vis its Business Principles for Combating Bribery) are developing tools to facilitate external verification of the 
quality of corporate anti-corruption programs.  























strengths, and (credibility) limitations. Civil regulation, by contrast, has gone further for labor 
standards than for anti-corruption in addressing credibility through rulemaking and monitoring. 
But the proliferation of civil labor codes and certification options has meant that no single, 
unequivocal signal is communicated to stakeholders, limiting any momentum to reshape social 
norms. As Figure 4 illustrates, convergence around a common approach could set in motion a 
cumulative spiral of improvement: 
  A more unified approach to credibility could accelerate the adoption of social norms that 
further de-legitimize contravention of the ILO‟s core labor standards (channel 1 in Figure 
4).  
  A better alignment of government-centric and civil labor standards initiatives could also 
enhance the credibility of the former and the comprehensiveness of coverage of the latter 
(channel 2 in Figure 4) – the ILO/IFC Better Work informational platform seems to 
provide an ideal opportunity.  
  Closing the comprehensiveness-credibility gap could, in turn result in added momentum 
for both feedback loops, with rapid possible gains in effectiveness (channel 3 in Figure 4) 
 
 

















Though an assessment of global initiatives to foster carbon emissions reduction is a vast 
subject in itself, the approach adopted in this paper highlights one theme in particular for further 
analysis -- namely a striking seeming disconnect  between, on the one hand, vibrant civil society  
engagement with the challenges of climate change and, on the other, a pre-occupation with 
seeking solutions exclusively in the official, government-centric realm.  From a government-
centric perspective, the relatively narrow focus of the 2009 Copenhagen Accord – on targets and 
monitoring – can be perceived as a step backwards from more ambitious aspirations for a global 
treaty. But from the perspective laid out in this paper, the challenges at Copenhagen point to the 



















citizen expectations vis-à-vis their national governments) as a necessary complement to 
comprehensive official global action.  
All three of the above examples suggest ways of catalyzing virtuous spirals by leveraging 
interactions between credibility-enhancing and comprehensiveness-expanding initiatives. 
Realizing this potential for virtuous spirals would require a profound shift in approach. Civil and 
government-centric approaches to global regulation generally have been viewed as entirely 
separate from one another, involving different players, different cultures and much mutual 
suspicion. The approach here calls on the protagonists of different regulatory forms to come to 
terms with their preferred forms‟ limitations – and the potential contribution of other forms, in a 
complementary, mutually-reinforcing process.  To put it differently: progress in globalized 
regulation is not likely to come through some sudden top-down breakthrough. Rather, the way 
forward is likely to be incremental and cumulative, engaging and monitoring  across borders, 
bottom-up as well as top down – transcending a too neat, and ultimately unhelpful, bifurcation 
between civil society advocacy and technocratic rule-making. 
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Annex A: The Criteria for Benchmarking Globalized Regulatory Effectiveness 
(Note: The benchmarks  assess comprehensiveness and credibility from a globalized perspective, with no 




***   Near universal coverage; includes all major stakeholders with influence on outcome 
**  Includes a substantial number of major stakeholders with influence on outcome 
*   Some coverage, includes some stakeholders with influence on outcome 
 
Rule process legitimacy 
***  Included/affected stakeholders fully accept legitimacy & good faith of rule-making body 
**  Included/affected stakeholders acknowledge the good faith of the rule-makers efforts, but 
  with some skepticism as to whether the rules bind their signatories. 
*  Affected stakeholders do not acknowledge the right of rule-makers to set rules, and/or the  
  good faith of their efforts, and/or that the rules impose any binding obligations. 
 
Monitoring quality 
***  The arrangements for independent monitoring of compliance with the rules are robust. 
**  Partial arrangements for independent monitoring are in place. 
*  There are no credible arrangements in place for independent monitoring of compliance. 
 
Enforcement quality 
***  Clear, costly and credible sanctions for non-compliance with the rules are in place 
**  There are some clear potential costs to non-compliance, but their deterrent effect is 
  limited (e.g. limited probability of detection and/or peer reputational impact) 
*  There are no credible sanctions for non-compliance.  
 
Monitoring and enforcement legitimacy 
***  Included/affected stakeholders fully accept the role of independent monitors, and have  
  confidence in the robustness of their efforts; and fully accept the authority of enforcement 
  bodies to follow-through with agreed-upon sanctions. 
**  Included/affected stakeholders accept the desirability of monitoring and enforcement, and  
            are hopeful, but somewhat uncertain, that credible arrangements are in place, or are being  
            developed. 
*  Included/affected stakeholders lack confidence in the robustness of monitoring efforts or 
the sanctions regime, and do not acknowledge the right of any actor to impose sanctions.   30 
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